Ethio-Eritrea: The Quest for Peace!

By Fitsum G.

December 15, 2004

To change such scenario, it is now weeks since a new peace overture has been presented by Ethiopian PM Meles. In the wake of the Algiers Peace Agreement, readily signed by the leaders of the two countries (after a devastating war), an arbitration was agreed up on, to delimit and demarcate the 600-mile common border. The so-called Ethiopia Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC) then came up with a controversial verdict when the details showed that the very symbolic town of Badme, the trigger point, was 'awarded' to Eritrea! Such decision was indigestible to Addis Ababa, and more importantly to the inhabitants of the vicinity. It had gone against every existing reality. This town had always been under the administration of Ethiopians, and the verdict created an enormous embarrassment to Addis. It is not that Badme was a golden triangle, nor a huge petroleum well, but it had become the symbol of Ethiopian resistance (to the May 1998 Eritrean aggression). And to give that away to the enemy had appeared too much! But in politics, situations changed with time, and policies had to adapt, correspondingly, the PM declared in parliament. Only the Bible was untouchable!

The issue got even more complicated when we came to know that also the Eritrean government had invested much of its credibility and honour on the claim of Badme, (and this thanks to the very first colonial maps). Isayas was quoted as saying that 'to give Badme away meant the sun did not rise in the east'! And the ruling legitimized his words. The arbitrators said they decided, having carefully scrutinized the evidence they were presented with by the parties. Opposition parties were later to say that few in Ethiopia had known about the contents and claim they had opposed the way the trial was being handled, (Ethiopian professionals were excluded) and that foreigners could not have known better. In any case, the commitment to be bound, tied our hands up, making our rejection of the verdict unacceptable. It alienated us from the world, while Eritrea capitalized on it. Ethiopia was cornered.

Now, leaving aside the blunders the Ethiopian government might have made in handling the dissemination of the verdict, the inevitable result had been public fury, and a blow to confidence in government, accused of running a 'secretive system'. Opposition parties denounced it, making of it a cardinal issue. Surely, this episode did risk to erode some government's credibility. (People had died for their country's border; the war had provoked immense waste; every one's assistance had been sought and secured. But in bargaining the peace, the arbitration, no one was consulted, the protest went. No debates. No voices. No choices. And yet such hugely critical subject deserved better treatment. The ruling party, the executive did not have exclusive rights!)

The Ethiopian government later protested that the spirit of Algiers was breached, and peace was unattainable while conditions on the ground remained flammable. Denying the evident could not convey harmony. The media reiterated such 'official view', but there was no way of reversing the verdict. The answer was: 'verdicts, no matter how unfair or unjust, were made to be implemented. Period! Otherwise, disputes would be vicious and interminable!'

The Ethiopian government's official rejection of the verdict might have emboldened/gratified the people, but it could not avoid the rage of the international community, (and that of Eritrea). Now it was Ethiopia which was accused of not abiding by the ruling of an international entity, not abiding by the very terms to which it had willingly subscribed. UNMEE, (the UN Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia) mandated to control the border area so that fresh hostilities would not erupt, found itself prolonging its policing, but it could not go on too long, though. After all, there was a yearly expense of 200 million USD, which could be better used for development. Friends and foes of Ethiopia recommended that it needed to concede. 'Governments were at times required to accept unpopular decisions and be able to guide their peoples all the same', they preached. Some even went to the extent of suggesting the fabrication further south of 'another Badme', if need be!

Certainly, the Ethiopian government's position was unenviable. In any Western democracy, a government in such vest would have been swept out of office. A vote of non confidence! When a war of aggression was reversed with immense sacrifice, 'losing the peace' would be unimaginable! Critics have since asserted, Victor Ethiopia had every right to bargain from a position of strength. If politics is about power, and if might is a major instrument of asserting will, Ethiopia had it all. Some had even fancied an exchange: Assab for some land in the border.

While the speed with which Ethiopia had unconditionally accepted the negotiations for a peace deal, might have reflected Ethiopia's anxiety to settle for peace soon, however, in the end, it resulted ill advised. Many had seen such deal as too vague to be trusted, as if there were some hidden agenda to it! Certain MPs now say they had stated their reservation; they had opposed 'too fast pacts'. But the PM did not spare them criticism any way. He said something like: EPRDF was not blessed with a strong, unshakable, reasonable and convincing opposition that would have prevented it from making mistakes which finally pushed it to such 'tunnel'! Today, there was no choice. EPRDF had rectified its errors, on its own!

Then, it should have been vanquished Eritrea begging for a rapid settlement. When the verdict became contrary to Ethiopia's expectations, the matter could not put the government at a worse situation! The military efforts had been shattered. The equation had changed! The aggressor had become the victim, and vice versa! A shift of guilt, and responsibilities had happened. The PM had then asked, 'How could I tell this to my generals?!'

After years of prevaricating, Ethiopia's weak position could not be spared the rule of international verdicts, and the pressure of time. Continuing to defy the ruling exposed it to severe criticism. Chancellor Schroeder had come to Addis to say it, so had done Premier Blair. All 'donors' were being impatient with Ethiopia. Logical. Otherwise, Ethiopia should wage another war and seek another peace. Back to square one! But no nation in Europe or North America would have been ready to support such 'invention'. To the say the least, all sorts and avenues of development assistance would be definitely closed. What it sanctions follow condemnation, and probably the days of this government counted!? Basically, no democratic country would afford to finance 'nonsense wars'. Could taxpayers' money be squandered in 'nonsense'? (In fact, the Ethio-Eritrean border war was for many, a non-sense, confronting it with the plight of the two peoples). Moreover, the level of need of Ethiopia is such that it could not afford any resistance to international pressure. The US would: look at Afghanistan, look at Iraq. Israel could: look at the Middle East! But not Ethiopia, with millions needing humanitarian relief. With a government that needed budgetary support to finance its day to day expenses. The very survival of Ethiopia was at stake, even national pride got in its way! Resistance!

The government's resistance earned the final nails to its coffin. The PM had to make a major policy reversal! That day in parliament, every one was astonished, even the members of the ruling coalition. A 'five-point new peace plan' had been tabled, but the substance of the deal was that Ethiopia now had to reverse its earlier position! The rush was again criticized, but the premier insisted that it was the appropriate time: parliament had already debated the issue at length, at other occasions, and that the matter had matured, that it was time that we accepted 'in principle' the ruling while negotiating on certain details on the basis of reciprocity: 'give and take'. Opposition insisted that there was nothing to take, but give, and accused government of a sell out!

The official version and justification for acceptance was that, 'yes, the ruling was 'unjust' and even 'illegal', but the world was not 'Eden', a paradise, a sphere of sublime justice and legality. Look at the international economic order! Situations of 'to be or not to be' often happen in life. We had to face the lesser of the two evils. The alternative of going to war with Eritrea, arresting all our plans of peace and development, was too costly!'

The prime minister elaborated on this reversal, taking all his time and energy, (in parliament, with a televised Q and A, and to resident ambassadors). More than anything else, including the land that would be ceded to Eritrea, he prioritized the need for peace, the need not to interrupt Ethiopia's ongoing development ventures. Asked about how one could reconcile such move with the question of sovereignty, the PM's answer was that the question of sovereignty could not be raised here, as it had already been successfully terminated, (yes, with the sacrifice paid in the battle ground). Land, trees, mountains that would be ceded following the verdict had nothing to do with it! That was a closed chapter, with glowing success. Today, we are faced with a court's case, and if the ruling did not delight us, well, we just have to learn to live with it. So was life. We bow to law not to aggression. But his rationalisation was soon labelled 'a mockery of the sacrifices paid'. And the matter does not seem to settle yet.

Dr Beyene Petros declared his party was out of such deal. There were ten 'no's in parliament's voting. Opposition parties have scheduled to stage a major 'show of force' with a mass rally. Meanwhile, however, the PM has reminded that he did not mind that people opposed government decisions as long as they did not convert the occasion into 'disturbance'! He admonished that government had the mandate to secure peace and order on the land, and would not let the imposition of a minority idea on the majority. After all, the peace deal was consecrated by parliament and that was it. Ethiopian mothers were tired of sending their children to fronts, he concluded!

What do ordinary Ethiopians say? Their major concern is yes, peace, and they would like to have it. But they fear that such 'concession to Eritrea' would not bring peace any way. There is a certain government in Eritrea, certainly dictatorial, (with opposition not allowed, no free press, no free courts, no civil society, no NGO community, no foreign interference). A country under the spell of one party, one person! And such state of affairs can never guarantee a peace seeking environment, any predictability. It recalls every one of the times of Hitler (who at all costs wanted to invade every country in Europe, and so he did, because no one took serious action to avert his ill intentions). Churchill's prophesy had later materialized, and the conflagration had engulfed Europe. Many see similarity in Isayas's psyche. The sub-region is at risk. Up to now, he had unleashed war with each of his neighbours. He had used every pretext to strike, even failing, but he never desisted yet. He has once again begun building up a huge army allocating all of Eritrea's human and financial resource, including an air force. And one cannot live in peace with such a regime, without an agenda of peace, an agenda of development, an agenda of concern of its citizens. That is why many observers are sceptical about Eritrea's acceptance and implementation of any peace proposal from Ethiopia.

The fundamental question is 'would a regime such as the one headed by Sheabia and Isasyas Afeworki ever accept a peace deal and implement it? It is as if it needed to defuse its internal tension by waging war with neighbours. It is as if it wanted to keep busy its people with continuous crisis situation. It is as if it could not reconcile its guerrilla warfare background with a new socio-economic and political reality! The fighting days had ceased and he seemed not to accept it! As long as it is far from the real, genuine voices of the population, and he is not forced to respond to them, as long as he is not governed by democratic principles, there is going to be no concrete forced step to peace in Eritrean government's intentions. Because peace would remove it from power, substituting it with popular figures with intent to improve the lot of the millions of poor Eritreans!

It is not that Ethiopia suddenly qualifies as a 'safe haven for democracy, human rights, liberties, free press, free opposition parties, free civic associations' etc. But compared with Eritrea, it becomes a giant! At least, there are positive steps in this direction. However, ultimately, Ethiopia's peace efforts may remain only on the shelves, and it might need to be prepared for harder days. Never abandon vigilance, and when needed, respond with prompt vigour. It is said the only way to avoid war is to be well prepared for it, and show it off, with the men, the arms and ammunitions, and the state of mind, (even when this might risk to slow down one's peace agenda. Because if a fire is burning in your neighbour, you cannot afford to sleep in peace. Sooner or later, it will slip to your premises, and burn you up! Hence, better be prepared to extinguish it, before it gets too late.